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MEASURING PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE 
Anthony Flynn1 
 
ABSTRACT. The European Commission has begun to measure 
procurement performance in countries belonging to the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Performance is understood in terms of practices 
designed to maximize value for money (VfM). This paper reports on the 
performance measurement system currently in use and what the 
European Commission’s own data tells us about contemporary 
procurement practices in EEA countries. It explains the methodology 
devised by the European Commission to operationalize and measure 
procurement performance at country level. It then reveals which 
European countries are above average, average or below average in the 
performance assessment. There follows some discussion on progress 
made to date in making public procurement more effective across the 
EEA. The paper alights on priorities for the future. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Value for money (VfM) has become something of a mantra in public 
procurement. In the academic literature scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to debating various VfM issues and what 
they mean for both theory and practice (Dimitri, 2013; Erridge & 
McIlroy, 2002; Loader, 2007; Thai, 2001). In the public domain 
law makers are forever propounding on the need for public sector 
organizations to secure better VfM in the procurement of goods 
and services. This is not surprising given the amounts of money at 
stake. Across OECD countries public procurement accounts for, on 
average, 12.8% of GDP and 29% of total government expenditure 
(OECD, 2013). Thus, anything that can be done to improve VfM in 
procurement is likely to have an appreciable impact on the state of 
a country’s public finances and even free up funds for investment 
or expenditure elsewhere.      
Europe is by no means immune to these trends. In an era 
of fiscal retrenchment and constrained public finances there is 
pressure on public contracting authorities to identify the most 
economically advantageous option that the supply market has to 
offer. The most recent legislative reform initiative of the European 
Commission proves the point. It has VfM as one of its two priorities; 
the other being the simplification of the tendering process 
(European Commission, 2016). Aiming to maximize VfM not only 
                                                          
1 Anthony Flynn, PhD, works at Dublin City University (DCU) Business School, 
Ireland. His research focuses on SME involvement in public procurement.  
2 
 
supports sound public finances. It is also consistent with having a 
competitive, dynamic and diverse supply marketplace (Caldwell et 
al., 2005; European Commission, 2008).  
But how do we know if public contracting authorities are 
adhering to best practice procurement and if VfM really is being 
achieved? And can we measure and compare the relative 
performance of countries in their use of VfM procurement 
practices? The European Commission has developed a 
methodology that begins to answer these questions (European 
Commission, 2015). It sets down six indicators of VfM 
procurement, which relate to the number of bidders for a contract, 
open advertising of contracts, aggregation of demand, type of 
award criteria employed, decision speed, and reporting of 
information pertaining to contract awards. It then assesses the 
performance of contracting authorities in 30 EEA2 countries using 
these six indicators and puts each country into one of three 
performance categories: above average, average, below average. 
While not exhaustive, it does provide the first systematic 
assessment of procurement performance and the prevalence of 
VfM practices across Europe.  
The purpose of this paper is to describe the European 
Commission’s methodology in more detail and what it reveals 
about procurement performance across the 30 EEA countries. The 
paper takes the following format. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the public procurement landscape in Europe. The 
paper then moves on to describing the methodology employed by 
the European Commission to measure procurement performance 
at national level. The first data released from the European 
Commission on procurement performance is then reported on. 
There follows a discussion on current procurement performance in 
Europe as well as the steps which need to be taken to drive 
progress over the coming years.  
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN EUROPE 
                                                          
2 The EEA comprises all 28 Member States of the European Union plus 
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Public procurement accounts for approximately 16% of EU GDP3. It 
is an area of major legislative and policy interest for political actors 
at national and supranational levels. The European Commission 
acts as the primary institutional rule setter for public procurement 
in the EEA. It does so by issuing Directives, which contracting 
authorities in EEA countries must abide by when procuring goods 
and services. These Directives cover all aspects of the 
procurement process, including: the financial thresholds over 
which contracting authorities are obliged to publicly advertise their 
contracts in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), the 
conditions under which contracting authorities can negotiate with 
suppliers, the length of time a contract must be advertised, and 
redress mechanisms for suppliers.  
As well as legally-binding Directives, the European 
Commission also issues policy guidance to EEA Members and their 
contracting authorities. To date, this has included 
recommendations and advice on how to best achieve VfM, 
facilitate SMEs in contract competitions, source innovative product 
and service solutions, and promote environmental and social 
objectives through ethically aware purchasing – the so-called 
‘horizontal policies’ spoken of by Arrowsmith (2010). All of this 
policy guidance and support is intended to make procurement play 
a strategic role in public service delivery and contribute to a Europe 
that is financially stable, economically prosperous, socially 
inclusive and environmentally sustainable.  
The policies and initiatives that the European Commission 
has introduced over the last decade have been significant and 
wide ranging. But what is actually happening on the ground? Are 
public contracting authorities adhering to best practices in VfM 
procurement? And is adherence similar across all EEA countries or 
are there differences between them? To answer these questions 
the European Commission has developed a methodology to 
measure procurement performance using six indicators of VfM. It 
was used for the first time in 2014 and generated important 
insights into procurement performance at national level. The 
remainder of this paper is given over to describing this 
methodology and reporting on the results that the European 
Commission has released thus far.    
 
PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE  
                                                          
3 Figure cited by the European Commission. 
http://eceuropa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/  
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The methodology devised by the European Commission to 
measure procurement performance consists of six VfM indicators 
(see Table 1). These are labelled (i) one bidder (ii) no calls for bids 
(iii) aggregation (iv) award criteria (v) decision speed and (vi) 
reporting quality. Each of these indicators relates in some way to 
professional, transparent and VfM-oriented procurement. Each 
indicator is described in more detail below.   
The first indicator of procurement performance is ‘one 
bidder’. ‘One bidder’ indicates the level of competition for public 
sector contracts. Before this again, it signals the ability and 
willingness of firms to access and bid for contracts. It is measured 
as the proportion of contracts awarded where there is only a single 
bidder in the competition. Having a single bidder in a competition 
is undesirable. Essentially, it means that buyers have no choice 
over the price, quality and functionality of goods and services 
available to them. Limited choice is not conducive to realizing VfM. 
The optimal situation is to have many bidders to select from 
(Caldwell et al., 2005; PwC, 2011). Therefore, the fewer the 
number of ‘one bidder’ competitions the better in performance 
terms. 
The second performance indicator is ‘no calls for bids’. ‘No 
calls for bids’ is an approximation of openness and transparency in 
the advertising and award of public contracts. It is measured as 
the proportion of contracts negotiated with suppliers without being 
preceded by a public request for tender (RFT). Not publishing a RFT 
before awarding a contract limits the number of potential bidders. 
Reflective of this, lack of visibility of contract opportunities has 
been cited by small firms as an obstacle to their participation in 
public procurement (Loader, 2005, 2015). This situation is neither 
conducive to maximizing VfM or upholding the integrity of public 
sector tendering. For this reason, low incidence of ‘no calls for 
bids’ is associated with superior procurement performance.  
The third performance indicator is ‘aggregation’. 
‘Aggregation’ refers to contracting authorities combining their 
purchasing requirements and approaching the supply market on 
this basis. It is measured as the proportion of procurement 
procedures carried out where there is more than one contracting 
authority involved. By aggregating demand contracting authorities 
can exploit economies of scale. Sorte Junior (2013) demonstrated 
how this approach not only reduces procurement costs but also 
leads to the standardization and quality optimization of products 
and services. Other advantages include the ability to attract new 
suppliers, develop supplier management capabilities, and enhance 
the skills of purchasing staff (Johnson, 1999; Tella & Virolainen, 
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2005). On the other hand, a low level of aggregation implies that 
opportunities for cost savings, standardization and organizational 
learning are being missed. Hence, performance is strengthened to 
the extent that procurement procedures involve two or more 
contracting authorities coming together and purchasing as a single 
entity.  
The fourth performance indicator is ‘award criteria’. It is 
measured as the proportion of contracts awarded on the basis of 
lowest bid price only. There are two broad approaches to awarding 
contracts. The first is exclusively price-based. The second employs 
a mix of pricing and qualitative factors such as quality, service 
delivery and innovation - otherwise known as Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender (MEAT). As an evaluation and award 
approach, MEAT is regarded as offering better economic value over 
the medium-long term (Dimitri, 2013). Therefore, from a 
performance perspective, minimising the proportion of price-only 
contracts is what contracting authorities ought to be aiming for.  
The fifth performance indicator is ‘decision speed’. As the 
label suggests, it denotes the time it takes for a contract to be 
awarded. It is measured as the period of time between the 
deadline for receipt of tenders and the actual awarding of the 
contract. Short procurement times suggest higher procedural 
efficiency by the contracting authority (PwC, 2011). Lengthy 
procurement times, on the other hand, impose opportunity costs 
for buyers and suppliers (Centre for Economic & Business 
Research, 2013). For example, suppliers may be reluctant to bid 
for other contracts while awaiting the outcome of a live 
competition. The goal, therefore, should be to minimize the time 
taken to award the contract once the deadline for bids or tenders 
has passed. In this way procurement performance is enhanced.  
The sixth and final performance indicator is ‘reporting 
quality’. What it captures is the quality and completeness of 
information furnished by contracting authorities after a competition 
has finished. It is measured as the proportion of awards containing 
no information about the contract value. Publishing details on the 
value of contracts awarded provides suppliers with a useful source 
of information on how to bid in future competitions. Notably, both 
buyers and suppliers have stated that providing information and 
clarification to suppliers can improve the quality and focus of their 
future tendering efforts (Flynn et al., 2013). Putting such 
information into the public domain also lets external stakeholders, 
including taxpayers, know how their money is being spent. On this 
basis, performance is supported to the extent that contracting 
authorities publish information on the value of contracts awarded.   
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Table 1 
 Measurement System for Procurement Performance 
 Performance 
indicator 
Measure Performance 
thresholds 
Explanatory note 
1 One bidder The proportion 
of contract 
awards where 
there is only a 
single bidder. 
Satisfactory  
≤ 10% 
Average  
10-20%  
Unsatisfactory 
> 20% 
This indicator 
refers to the level 
of competitive 
intensity in 
contract 
competitions. 
More bidders are 
preferable as they 
give contracting 
authorities more 
choice. Choice, in 
turn, is linked to 
achieving VfM.    
2 No calls for 
bids  
The proportion 
of procurement 
procedures 
that are 
negotiated 
without being 
preceded by a 
call for tender. 
Satisfactory  
≤ 5% 
Average 
5-10% 
Unsatisfactory 
≥ 10% 
This indicator 
reflects 
transparency in 
contract 
competitions. 
Publishing a call 
for tender is 
always advised as 
it opens up the 
selection process 
to a larger number 
of bidders.  
3 Aggregation The proportion 
of procurement 
procedures 
that involve 
more than one 
buyer.  
 
Satisfactory  
≥ 10% 
 
Unsatisfactory 
< 10% 
 
This indicator 
captures how often 
contracting 
authorities buy 
together as a 
consortium. 
Aggregating 
demand can yield 
better prices by 
exploiting 
economies of 
scale. It can also 
lead to the transfer 
of expertize 
between 
contracting 
authorities.     
4 Award 
criteria 
The proportion 
of procedures 
awarded using 
price as the 
sole criterion.  
Satisfactory  
< 80% 
 
Unsatisfactory 
≥ 80% 
This indicator 
shows whether 
supplier selection 
is based on quoted 
price only or if 
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  quality is also 
taken into 
account. The latter 
is associated with 
VfM over the 
medium-long term. 
5 Decision 
speed 
The mean time 
between the 
deadline for 
receipt of 
offers and the 
awarding of the 
contract. 
Satisfactory  
< 120 days 
 
Unsatisfactory 
≥ 120 days 
This indicator 
reflects the speed 
of decision making 
over contract 
awards. Slow 
decision making 
results in 
uncertainty and 
costs for buyers 
and suppliers.    
6 Reporting 
quality 
The proportion 
of contract 
awards 
containing no 
information 
about the 
value of 
contracts 
awarded 
(excluding 
framework 
agreements). 
Satisfactory  
≤ 3% 
 
Unsatisfactory 
> 3% 
This indicator 
represents the 
quality of 
information 
provided by 
contacting 
authorities to the 
supply 
marketplace and 
to the wider public. 
Disclosing 
information is 
important as it 
means that 
suppliers can 
make more 
informed bidding 
decisions and 
stakeholders are 
made aware of 
how public money 
is being spent.   
 
Measuring Procurement Performance 
Each of the six VfM indicators has a corresponding 
performance threshold (see Table 1). The performance thresholds 
are based on two factors (i) qualitative policy judgments by the 
European Commission on what is good practice and (ii) recent data 
for individual countries.  Countries are classed as satisfactory, 
average or unsatisfactory on indicators 1-2 and satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory on indicators 3-6. In the case of ‘one bidder’, for 
example, ≤ 10% of contracts attracting a single bidder is 
satisfactory but > 20% is unsatisfactory. Anything in between these 
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two ranges is average. To give another example, a mean ‘decision 
speed’ of < 120 days is regarded as satisfactory but > 120 days is 
unsatisfactory. A weighted average of the six VfM indicators is used 
to determine overall procurement performance for each country. 
Performance indicators 1-2 - ‘one bidder’ and ‘no calls for bids’ – 
are given a triple weighting by the European Commission, as they 
are judged to be more impactful than the other indicators in driving 
procurement performance. 
 
Data Source 
Data to measure the procurement performance of each 
country comes from Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), which is the 
official listing site for public contracts in the EEA. Contracts listed 
on TED are attributed to their country of origin. Data on the total 
number of contracts for each country for a one year period, in this 
case 2014, is then compiled and statistically analysed by the 
European Commission. By law, contracts above certain financial 
values must be listed on TED. For supplies and services contracts 
the values are €135,000, €209,000 and €418,000 for 
government departments, local/regional authorities and utilities 
respectively. For works contracts the value is €5,225,000. 
Procurement performance is understood solely in reference to 
contracts listed on TED. Public contracts that fall under these 
thresholds and that are not advertised on TED do not form part of 
the analysis undertaken by the European Commission.  
 
COUNTRY RANKINGS 
The performance of each of the 30 EEA countries across 
the six VfM indicators is given in Table 2. Procurement 
performance is strong on some indicators but relatively weak on 
others. On the first indicator, ‘one bidder’, only 6 of the 30 
countries are classed as having satisfactory performance. The 
remainder are either average (14) or unsatisfactory (10). This 
suggests that having at least two bidders in all contract 
competitions is problematic for most countries. Performance is 
better on the second indicator: ‘no calls for bids’. Here 15 of the 
30 countries are in the satisfactory category, meaning that less 
than 5% of their listed contracts are negotiated without being 
preceded by a call for tender. The remainder have either average 
(5) or unsatisfactory performance (10). As referred to already, 
these two indicators are triple weighted in the overall calculation of 
procurement performance by the European Commission and so 
are, by definition, the most salient.  
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On the ‘aggregation’ indicator, 13 countries have 
satisfactory performance and 17 countries have unsatisfactory 
performance. By the measurement threshold used, this means that 
the majority of countries use consortium arrangements in less than 
10% of contracts. For the ‘award criteria’ indicator, 19 countries 
have satisfactory performance and 11 countries have 
unsatisfactory performance. This reflects the finding that for most 
countries no more than 80% of their contracts were awarded 
based solely on lowest bid price. The fifth indicator, ‘decision 
speed’ records the highest level of satisfactory performance 
among countries (25) versus unsatisfactory performance (5). 
Countries are awarding contracts within 120 days, on average, of 
the closing date for receipt of bids or tenders. On the sixth and 
final indicator, ‘reporting quality’, there is an even split between 
satisfactory performance and unsatisfactory performance. That is, 
15 countries include information about the value of the contract in 
over 97% of award decisions but the other 15 countries do not 
meet this target.         
 No country is rated satisfactory across all six performance 
indicators. Finland comes close. It is classed as average on the 
‘one bidder’ indicator and satisfactory on the other five. Denmark 
also scores impressively. It is rated as satisfactory on indicators 1-
5, but is deemed to be unsatisfactory on ‘reporting quality’. At the 
other end of the spectrum are countries that are unsatisfactory on 
most indicators. Slovakia is rated unsatisfactory on indicators 1-5. 
Only on ‘reporting quality’ is its performance rated as satisfactory. 
Similarly, Romania is reported as unsatisfactory on indicators 1-4 
and is only satisfactory on ‘award criteria’ and ‘reporting quality’.      
Table 2 
 Procurement Performance Across Six Indicators  
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Austria ≈   X    X 
Belgium ≈        X 
Bulgaria X ≈ X   X    
Croatia X X  X X     
Cyprus X X    X      
Czech 
Republic 
≈ X  X  X      
Denmark          X 
Estonia ≈ X X X     
Finland ≈          
France ≈   X    X 
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Germany ≈ ≈ X    X 
Greece ≈   X X X   
Hungary X X        
Iceland   ≈      X 
Ireland     X  X X 
Italy X ≈    X X 
Latvia X X   X     
Lithuania  ≈ ≈ X X     
Luxembou
rg 
    X    X 
Malta  ≈     X     
Netherlan
ds 
    X    X 
Norway  ≈        X 
Poland X   X X     
Portugal ≈   X    X 
Romania X X X X     
Slovakia X X X X X   
Slovenia X X        
Spain ≈ X X    X 
Sweden ≈        X 
UK          X  = Satisfactory performance 
≈  = Average performance 
X  = Unsatisfactory performance 
 
Overall procurement performance for each of the 30 EEA 
countries is given in Table 3. Countries fall into one of three 
performance categories (i) above average (ii) average and (iii) 
below average. There are 11 countries in the above average 
category, 7 in the average category and 12 in the below average 
category. Some geographical patterns can be discerned in 
procurement performance. The above average category comprises 
all the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway 
and Iceland), the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), 
the Anglo countries (Ireland and the UK) and Malta. 
 The average category contains a mix of founding or long-
standing EU Member States (France, Germany, Austria, Portugal 
and Greece) and two countries that became EU Members in 2004 
(Lithuania and Poland). With the exception of Italy and Spain, the 
12 countries in below average group are all recent additions to the 
EU, having joined in 2004 or later (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). We can summarize the results for overall procurement 
performance with two key observations. First, the number of below 
average performers marginally exceeds above average performers. 
Second, the performance of countries that have only recently 
11 
 
become EU members lags that of founding or long-standing 
members.  
Table 3 
 Overall Procurement Performance 
 Above average Average Below 
average 
Austria     
Belgium     
Bulgaria   o  
Croatia   o  
Cyprus   o  
Czech Republic   o  
Denmark     
Germany     
Estonia   o  
Finland     
France     
Greece     
Hungary   o  
Iceland     
Ireland     
Italy   o  
Latvia   o  
Lithuania     
Luxembourg     
Malta     
Netherlands     
Norway     
Poland     
Portugal     
Romania   o  
Slovenia   o  
Slovakia   o  
Spain   o  
Sweden     
UK     
Total 11 7 12 
 
 
COMMENTARY  
Achieving VfM in public procurement has become a policy 
priority in most jurisdictions and is the subject of ongoing inquiry 
among researchers (Dimitri, 2013; Erridge & McIlroy, 2002; 
Loader, 2007; Thai, 2001). There remains a dearth of evidence, 
however, on what is happening at both organizational and country 
level to further the VfM objective. This is why the methodology 
devised by the European Commission to measure procurement 
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performance across the 30 EEA countries is of particular interest 
to academics, policy makers and practitioners. Its initial findings 
provide among the most comprehensive assessments carried out 
to date on the implementation of procurement best practices on a 
country-by-country basis. Evidently, there is still some way to go 
before procurement can be said to be delivering optimum VfM in 
Europe. While performance is good on some indicators, it is poor 
on others. Moreover, there are significant performance gaps 
between EEA countries even though they are subject to the same 
policy and regulatory regime. These points are discussed in more 
detail below.    
 
Performance Indicators  
 
The majority of EEA countries appear to be experiencing 
difficulty in ensuring that all contract competitions have a 
minimum of two bidders. The cause of this situation is not exactly 
clear. It could be that specifications are too narrow, thus restricting 
the number of eligible tenderers. Findings produced by Loader 
(2005, 2015) show that narrow specifications is certainly a major 
barrier for small firms. Alternatively, buyers are not interacting with 
the supply marketplace and not generating awareness and interest 
among firms about available opportunities – a problem averred to 
by Cabras (2011). Whatever the reason, the net effect is that 
contracting authorities are missing out on getting better value from 
the supply marketplace.   
Ensuring that all contract awards are preceded by a public 
call to tender is also proving difficult for almost half the 30 EEA 
countries. Not only does this restrict buyer choice and the 
likelihood of securing a competitive deal, it also creates the 
impression, particularly if you are a small or newly established firm, 
that public sector tendering is opaque and not altogether fair. 
There a number of possible explanations for why this happens. 
Contracting authorities sometimes find it objectively impossible to 
define the means of satisfying their needs or assessing what the 
supply marketplace can offer. This may result in them entering into 
a competitive dialogue with suppliers without publicly issuing a 
RFT4. It may also be that contracting authorities are not abiding by 
EC Procurement Directives, something which is not unknown to 
                                                          
4 EC Procurement Directives contain limited derogations from publicly 
advertising supply opportunities. These are articulated in Article 31 of 
Directive 2004/18 and Article 40 (3) of Directive 2004/17.  
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happen (Gelderman, Ghijsen & Brugman, 2006; Martin, Hartley & 
Cox, 1999).   
Contracting authorities coming together and purchasing as 
a consortium is another area in which improvement is required 
across the majority of EEA countries. Reluctance on the part of 
contracting authorities to pursue this approach may be due to lack 
of awareness on the potential savings it can yield or uncertainty 
over how to organize and manage consortia (Essig, 2000). 
Interestingly, the new EC Procurement Directives, which came into 
force on April 2016, contain guidance on how public sector 
organizations in the same or different countries can aggregate 
their supply requirements (European Commission, 2016). This is 
likely to pave the way for the more extensive use of consortia 
purchasing arrangements in the years ahead.  
Public contracting authorities in the majority of EEA 
countries appear to be judicious in their use of evaluation criteria, 
relying on a blend on price and non-price determinants. However, 
there is still scope for improvement. Ideally, bids should be 
evaluated on qualitative as well as price factors (Dimitri, 2013). 
While expediency and/or external pressure sometimes dictate that 
price alone is considered, contracting authorities have to be able to 
take a more encompassing and longer-term perspective on 
economic value when procuring goods and services.  
Of all the performance indicators, EEA countries are 
performing best on decision speed. It is in the interests of every 
contracting authority that competitions are completed in a timely 
fashion (Centre for Economic & Business Research, 2013; PwC, 
2011). Timeliness equates to administrative efficiency. It also 
means that goods and services get to end users quickly. Faster 
decision making over contract awards is equally beneficial to 
supply firms. It reduces wait-times and uncertainty and frees up 
their resources to pursue other opportunities. It also helps to build 
goodwill among suppliers towards the contracting authority.   
Less positive is reporting quality, with only half of all EEA 
countries attaining a satisfactory level of performance. This may 
reflect poorly developed communication channels and reporting 
mechanisms in many countries’ public procurement systems, 
something which the OECD (2013) has highlighted. It may also be 
rooted in tentativeness on the part of contracting authorities to 
disclose information and to engage with the supply marketplace 
(Cabras, 2011). Yet it is something that must be addressed. The 
more information suppliers have the better they will be able to 
compete in the public sector marketplace (Flynn et al,. 2013). All 
procurement stakeholders stand to gain as a result.  
14 
 
 
Performance Gaps between EEA Countries 
 
The performance gap between long-established EEA 
members, such as the Benelux countries, and those which have 
only recently joined, mainly the former communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, is notable. Perhaps this gap is 
inevitable, as the latter group are still transitioning their economies 
and governance systems towards a free market, capitalist model. If 
this is the case, we should expect their procurement performance 
to equalize with the long-established EEA members over time as 
they become more embedded in the European Single Market and 
accustomed to the workings and expectations of the EU. 
Nonetheless, the European Commission may have to lend 
additional support and expertise to these countries over the short-
medium term in order to raise professionalism across government 
purchasing and ensure that VfM procurement is being 
implemented in a systematic way.    
The recent additions to the EEA are not the only group that 
need to improve on their procurement performance. Two of the six 
founding members of the European project, Germany and France, 
are only classed as average. In each case they are found to be 
average on the ‘one bidder’ indicator and sub-standard on the 
‘aggregation’ and ‘reporting quality’ indicators. These are issues 
that require attention, particularly as Germany and France are the 
first and third largest economies in the EEA respectively and 
together account for a substantial percentage of total expenditure 
by contracting authorities in Europe. Austria, Greece and Portugal, 
which are established members of the EEA, also fall into the 
average performance category. As with France and Germany, their 
difficulties appear to lie in attracting at least two bidders to every 
competition, using consortia purchasing arrangements, and 
reporting information on contract awards.     
Even more remarkable is the below average performance 
of Italy and Spain. Again, both countries are long-standing EEA 
participants and rank as the fourth and fifth largest economies in 
Europe respectively. Yet their performance is only satisfactory on 
two of the six indicators. Based on foregoing scholarship this is not 
altogether surprising. Evidence has been adduced by Trionfetti 
(2000) which suggests that Italy and Spain, along with France, are 
among the most difficult public procurement markets for foreign 
suppliers to access. Such quasi-protectionism may go some way 
towards explaining why neither country is deemed satisfactory in 
making sure all contract competitions have at least two bidders 
and that all contract opportunities above EU determined financial 
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thresholds are publicly advertised. The fact that when it comes to 
the delivery of public projects Italy is perceived to have a relatively 
high level of corruption and Spain a moderate level of corruption 
also needs to be considered in accounting for their below-average 
procurement performance (PwC, 2013).   
 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict on delivering VfM in public procurement 
throughout Europe is one of progress made, but with still some way 
to go before the desired level of performance is reached. The 
development of a methodology to assess procurement 
performance is itself a positive step, which will help to create 
greater awareness among EEA countries on the need to implement 
procurement best practices across their public sectors. The adage 
“what you can’t measure, you can’t manage” seems apposite in 
this sense.      
Looking forward, there are a number of priority actions for 
the European Commission and EEA countries to take. The first is to 
ensure that the new Procurement Directives are implemented in 
full at national level. As previously referred to, the new Directives 
aim to realize better value in public purchasing and simplify the 
tendering process for buyers and suppliers. The second is to 
periodically monitor procurement performance across all EEA 
countries. The data to do so is readily available from TED. The third 
priority is for each country to have appropriate governance and 
oversight mechanisms in place and to enforce compliance with 
procurement regulations and policies – something which has been 
recommended in recent scholarship on public purchasing (Flynn & 
Davis, 2015). Finally, and as has been noted by the OECD (2013) 
and academics in the field (McCue & Gianakis, 2001; Roman, 
2015), VfM is supported to the extent that each country has a 
cadre of public buyers with the knowledge, skills and experience to 
astutely manage contract competitions while remaining compliant 
with the law.  
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